John Boyle (October 28, 1774 – February 28, 1835 or January 28, 1834) was a United States federal judge and a member of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Born in Botetourt County, Virginia, near what is now Castlewood, Boyle moved with his father to Whitley's Station, Kentucky (a settler's fort near present-day Crab Orchard) in 1779. Boyle was educated by private tutors and in private schools. He read law in 1797 and began private practice in Lancaster, Kentucky from 1797 to 1802. He was also the deputy counselor at law for the Court of Quarter Sessions of Kentucky in 1797, and a member of the Kentucky House of Representatives in 1800.

Boyle was elected as a Republican to the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth U.S. Congresses (March 4, 1803 - March 3, 1809). He was one of the managers appointed by the House in January 1804 to conduct the impeachment proceedings against John Pickering, and, in December of the same year, against Samuel Chase. He was chairman of the Committee on Public Land Claims in the Ninth and Tenth Congresses. Boyle was appointed Governor of the Illinois Territory in 1809, but declined the office.

Boyle served as a judge of the Kentucky Court of Appeals from April 1809 to April 1810, serving as chief justice from April 1810 to November 8, 1826. His tenure spanned the Old Court-New Court controversy. He resigned to accept a recess appointment from President John Quincy Adams on October 20, 1826, to the United States District Court for the District of Kentucky, filling the seat vacated by the elevation of Robert Trimble to the Supreme Court of the United States. Boyle was officially nominated on December 13, 1826, was confirmed by the United States Senate on February 12, 1827, and received his commission the same day. He served until his death near Danville, Kentucky in 1834 or 1835. He is buried in Bellevue Cemetery there, and Boyle County, Kentucky was later [1842] named after him.

External links

   * John Boyle (congressman) at the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress

* John Boyle (congressman) at the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, a public domain publication of the Federal Judicial Center.
* History of the Sixth Circuit
* Allen, William B. (1872). A History of Kentucky: Embracing Gleanings, Reminiscences, Antiquities, Natural Curiosities, Statistics, and Biographical Sketches of Pioneers, Soldiers, Jurists, Lawyers, Statesmen, Divines, Mechanics, Farmers, Merchants, and Other Leading Men, of All Occupations and Pursuits. Bradley & Gilbert. pp. 277. http://books.google.com/books?id=s_wTAAAAYAAJ. Retrieved 2008-11-10.
* Robertson, George (1838). Biographical sketch of the Hon. John Boyle : an introductory lecture to the law class of Transylvania, November 7, 1838. A.G. Hodges. http://kdl.kyvl.org/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=kyetexts;cc=kyetexts;view.... Retrieved 2008-11-22.
Source: downloaded 2010 from Wikipedia.

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Following downloaded 2010 from a "History of the 6th Circuit [Court]," at

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/lib_hist/Courts/district%20court/KY/KY/...

John Boyle, son of John and Jane Boyle, was born October 28, 1774, at a place on the Clinch River called "Castle Woods,"1[first of 15 footnotes] in the (then) county of Botetourt, Virginia. The family immigrated to Kentucky in 1779, settling first at Whitley's Station near Boonesborough and then in Garrard County.2[Dictionary of American Biography. Vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1936), 532.] Educational facilities of rural Kentucky were limited, consequently young Boyle had no educational advantages beyond the instruction he received in Latin, Greek, and a few other subjects under the direction of Rev. Samuel Finley, a celebrated Presbyterian minister of Madison County. One historian described Boyle as being "of humble ancestry, and thus, without fortune or influential friends to aid him, by his own merit he attained . . . the highest position in the judiciary of Kentucky."3

Having a strong inclination for the law, Boyle studied law under the direction of Thomas Davis, of Mercer County, then a member of the U.S. Congress, and whom he succeeded as the representative of the district. He began practicing law in 1797 in Lancaster and was elected in 1800 to the Kentucky House of Representatives. In 1802, Boyle was elected, without opposition, to the U.S. House of Representatives where he became an active worker in the Republican party, then led by Thomas Jefferson. He served three successive terms, from March 4, 1803 to March 3, 1809.4 He was one of the managers appointed by the House of Representatives in January, 1804, to conduct the impeachment proceedings against John Pickering,5 and in December of the same year, against Samuel Chase.6 Boyle also served on the Committee on Public Land Claims during the Ninth and Tenth Congresses.

In 1809, just before Boyle left Washington, James Madison, the incoming President, offered Boyle the governership of the Illinois Territory. Boyle declined the appointment.7 On April 4, 1809, Boyle was appointed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The next year he became Chief Justice succeeding George M. Bibb. It was in this capacity that the work upon which Judge Boyle's reputation chiefly rests.8[The decisions of the court, while Boyle was upon the bench, are in fifteen volumes of the Kentucky Reports, from Bibb's (4 vols.), Marshall's (3 vols.), Littell's (5 vols.), and Monroe's (7 vols.).] While on the Kentucky Court of Appeals, he "adhered closely to the ancient precedents and technicalities of the common law."9[Levin, Lawyers and Lawmakers, 157.]

Boyle's most significant opinions on the court concerned land titles and debt relief, the leading issues of the era. Boyle's court upheld Kentucky's land statutes in defiance of a ruling of the Supreme Court, holdings that delighted natives and distressed absentee claimants. Less popular was his opinion in Blair v. Williams (1823), which declared unconstitutional Kentucky's debt relief law, a decision that prompted the General Assembly in 1824 to abolish Boyle's court and to create a new court of appeals. For the next two years, Boyle's "Old Court" [a.k.a. the anti-relief party] and the "New Court" [a.k.a. the relief party] operated as rivals. In 1826, when the anti-relief party captured control of the legislature, it abolished the "New Court."10[This was Boyle's most famous decision which arose from a series of legislative enactment's designed for the relief of debtors. In this decision Justice Boyle and his associates held that a two-years replevin statute, in it retroactive operation on contracts made prior to the enactment of it, was repugnant to that clause of the federal Constitution which declares that no state shall pass any act "impairing the obligation of contracts." The struggle was, as it were, for the stability of a constitutional government, and the efficiency and independence of an enlightened judiciary. William B. Allen, A History of Kentucky (Louisville: Bradley & Gilbert, Pub., 1872), 86-88; John E. Kleber, ed. The Kentucky Encyclopedia (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1992).109-110; Levin, Lawyers and Lawmakers, 157; Collins, History of Kentucky, 91.] On the 8th of November, 1826, when the struggle was over and the old court had been reestablished, Boyle resigned and was immediately appointed by President John Quincy Adams to the United States District Court of Kentucky, which office he held until his death.11[Bruce A. Ragsdale to Rita Wallace, July 14, 1998. See attached (at www.ca6.uscourts.gov) judicial database created by Federal Judicial History Office in 1998; a copy in Sixth Circuit Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio.]

According to Kentucky historian, Lewis Collins, "the appointment of associate justice of the supreme court of the United States was twice within his [Boyle's] reach; but he loved retirement . . . Upon the death of Judge Todd, he refused to be recommended as his successor; and, subsequently, expressed the same unwillingness upon the demise of Judge Trimble, of the same court."12 For one year, in the latter part of his life, Boyle was the sole professor at the Transylvania law school.

Just after he entered upon his professional career in 1797, Boyle married Elizabeth Tilford, the daughter of a "plain, pious, and frugal farmer," and moved to the town of Lancaster.13[They were married on August 10, 1797. Judges of the United States. 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983); Collins, History of Kentucky, 90, 207.] In the following year, upon an "out-lot" of the town, he built a small two-room log house. His wife, "who was ever his most loved companion,"14[Levin, Lawyers and Lawmakers, 158.] died in 1833, a victim of cholera. Judge Boyle survived her only until January 28, 1935, and was buried in Bellevue Cemetery in Danville. Boyle County, Kentucky, formed in 1842, was named in Judge Boyle's honor.15[Kleber, Kentucky Encyclopedia, 110.]

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Located in the Kentuckiana Digital Library:

Biographical sketch of the Hon. John Boyle : an introductory lecture to the law class of Transylvania, November 7, 1838 / by George Robertson (1790-1874). This was located in 2010 in the form of several .pdf files at http://kdl.kyvl.org/static/books/kyetexts/kyetexts_KUK-b92-70-27082...

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http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=19063345&ref=wvr

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Biography of John Boyle from the Boyle Family Genealogy, pp. 38-60:

John Boyle, son of Major John Boyle, was with his father at Boonesborough during the siege of that fort in August, 1778. Shortly thereafter, the family lived on a farm near Cove Spring, but the father soon transferred that tract to Jeremiah Tilford, and removed to a farm near Estill station. All these habitations were within the county of Kentucky, and when that county was carved into three, within Lincoln county, Virginia; but in 1785, the General Assembly formed Madison and Mercer counties, named after two illustrious patriots, when Cove Spring was left in Mercer, and the new home in Madison. And, having later removed to Paint Lick, the latter county was, in 1796, divided and Paint Lick became part of the new county of Garrard.

In these several homes John Boyle grew up. Of his childhood, little is known, "but, like other sons of pioneers, he witnessed the most strenuous and romantic scenes in Kentucky history, and inhaled their strengthening influences. In that day college education was impossible in Kentucky," and those who advanced in learning, had to improve such limited opportunities as came within reach. When six or seven years old, John accompanied the elder children to a neighborhood school taught by a peripatetic Irishman. His intellectual powers had not been exercised in acquiring the abstract knowledge conveyed in print, and while the faithful teacher labored diligently for many weeks, to inculcate the primary lessons of the books, John was unable to fix his attention sufficiently to learn the alphabet. The custom of that primitive period was for the teacher to board around, and while taking his turn at boarding with Major Boyle, he deemed it his duty to report to the father the fact of the lad's mental torpor. The others were bright, and as intelligent as the neighbors' children, but John seemed incapable of learning, and it was but a waste of time and money to keep him at school.

"Here for two months of patient effort, he had tried to teach him by every- means, yet John had not learned a letter, nor a figure."

"But the father, with whom John was a favorite, exploded at this harsh conclusion, and vehemently asserting his confidence in the child's capacity, said he should continue to attend the school. Unknown to the elders, John overheard the criticism of the teacher and the strenuous defense of the father," which vibrated on some slumbering chord in his memory, and awakened his dormant powers. At school the next day, when called to receive his lesson, he surprised the teacher by repeating the alphabet, and multiplication table, and it soon transpired that he could repeat many of the lessons taught to the older children in his presence, and unconsciously impressed upon his mind.

"Although his opportunities for scholastic instruction were limited, his early education was excellent, and his knowledge of what he had studied, thorough. Under the instruction of Samuel Finley, a pious Presbyterian minister, of Madison county, he acquired the rudiments of Greek and Latin, and the most useful of the sciences. With that splendid foundation, he continued the study of these branches, and became one of the most proficient scholars of that day in classics and mathematics. So remarkably well versed was he in the classics, that Dr. Blackburn, the first president of Centre College, said that John Boyle was one of the best Latin scholars he had ever known, and rivalled old Dr. Mason of New York in the extent of his classic reading."

"Notwithstanding that his father possessed land, slaves and other property, he was not unaccustomed to labor. Nature gave him primarily a mind and body exceedingly strong and robust, and he grew into manhood, possessed of unusual mental and physical power."

He studied law under Thomas T. Davis, then a member of Congress, who lived in Mercer county. For his convenience, while reading with Davis, young Boyle was received as a boarder in the family of Jeremiah Tilford, who lived upon the farm that formerly belonged to Major Boyle. Being admitted to the bar, he began to practice in Lancaster. Soon after, "in 1797, he married Elizabeth, the beautiful and cultured daughter" of his late host. He built a double log cabin, in which they began house-keeping (page 136). His groomsman was the celebrated Joseph Hamilton Daveiss (usually misspelled Daviess), who afterwards, as United States District Attorney, was the first prosecutor for treason of Aaron Burr. He was killed at Tippecanoe. Daviess developed a prodigious genius, and many thought he might, had he lived, contest with Mr. Clay the highest palm of oratory.

A family anecdote relates that he, too, was attracted by the Tilford girls, but was so diffident that he could not summon sufficient courage to cross the style where he sat during his visits. He married a sister of Chief Justice John Marshall.

The Tilford house stood on land now crossed by the line dividing Boyle and Mercer counties, which at an early day Major Boyle acquired by exchange for forty acres surrounding its attractive spring, a tract situated elsewhere, of eleven hundred acres. Afterwards he sold that farm, then embracing several hundred acres, to Jeremiah Tilford. When the latter died his son-in-law, Judge Boyle, purchased the place, and upon his death, his brother-in-law, Robert Tilford, bought it. The latter was born there in 1788, and after its purchase lived there until his death, in 1873.

Boyle lived in his first house until 1802, when he removed to a farm near Lancaster, living there until 181 1, then removing to another tract in that county. "He lived in cabins," says Robertson in his Scrap Book. In 1814 he removed to Mercer county.

As was the custom of the early bar, he followed the circuit and acquired a respectable practice. His uncommon memory re-tained the names and many personal facts relating to those whom he met, and when he offered for Congress, in 1802, it is said he could familiarly address by his first name, nearly every voter in the district and ask descriptio personae about the members of his family. He was chosen, as also to the next two succeeding Congresses, invariably without opposition. It is said that at one election the noble old governor, Isaac Shelby, offered himself as a candidate, and commenced an active canvass. Finding that Boyle was invincible, even against the prestige of his own fame and lofty character, the old hero withdrew from the contest, and gave loyal support to his friendly competitor.

Boyle was a Jeffersonian Democrat, and was first elected in the middle of Jefferson's first term. His character soon became known to the House. At his second term, he was placed on the Committee of Ways and Means, always the most important of its committees. He was ever active, influential and dignified. In 1804, the impeachment of Samuel Chase, an associate Justice of the Supreme Court, being resolved, the House, by ballot, chose Boyle as one of the impeachers, who were led by Randolph of Roanoke.

In early times travel from Kentucky eastward was almost wholly on horseback. The congressmen usually rode in company, the intervening country being sparsely settled. On one trip Boyle had a spirited steed. One frosty morning, in the act of mounting, the fractious animal threw him upon a slivered limb, which penetrated his body. With difficulty his companions withdrew the horrible lance, and applied water, their only available remedy, to the wound. No surgeon was near, but these were men of experience and courage, with a practical capacity to treat wounds, not ordinarily found among statesmen. After a delay of but one day, in relieving the fever, the whole party, Boyle included, proceeded on its way.

In 1807, Mr. Jefferson tendered him the office of Justice of the United States Supreme Court, but Boyle modestly declined it.^

The pay of a congressman at that period was small. Boyle found that the support of his growing family required more than his official income, and notwithstanding the flattering testimonial of a fourth nomination by unanimous vote, he declined it.

"President Madison, among his earliest official acts, and unsolicited, appointed him governor of Illinois, one of the most responsible, important and lucrative of all federal appointments. This alluring offer was accepted by Mr. Boyle, but only conditionally. On his return to Kentucky he was tendered a * * *
seat upon the bench of the Court of Appeals. Although the salary of an Appellate Judge was only $1,000, and the duties onerous, his attachment to Kentucky triumphed over his ambition, and pecuniary interests, and he took his seat upon the Appellate bench April 4, 1809. Ninian Edwards, then Chief Justice, solicited and obtained the abdicated governorship of Illinois. The next year, Mr. Boyle was promoted to the Chief Justiceship, the responsible duties of which he faithfully discharged to the time of his resignation," November 8, 1826.

"At the time of his appointment he was thirty-five years old, and still growing to the maturity of his powers. In personal appearance, he was attractive rather than imposing. He was about 5 feet 8 inches tall, rather heavily built, inclining to stoutness in later years, with regular and very expressive features, and dark brown eyes and hair. His manner is said to have been charmingly modest, and his talk simple and delightful."

"Then began for him a career of distinguished usefulness in

1 Robertson's Scrap Book, 113.

his profession. For more than sixteen years he occupied a position of the highest honor, dignity and power in the young commonwealth, and of the greatest influence in directing the lines of growth, of its jurisprudence during its formative period. It was an opportunity of the same nature as that which came to John Marshall upon the Supreme Bench of the nation, during the formative period of Federal jurisprudence, and the first construction of the national constitution. The mere printed record of his work is to be found in the fifteen volumes of Kentucky reports beginning with First Bibb, and ending with Third Monroe, but a more enduring record exists in the jurisprudence of his State and the honorable traditions of its bench and bar. Such an opportunity comes to few men. No man ever more worthily met the demand of his opportunity. It is a great thing for a man of thirty-five years of age, to find a great and congenial life work, and to be competent for it. There were offers of what would generally be considered advancement in the line of his profession. * * *
Before he left Congress, he was offered, by Mr. Jefferson, a seat on the Supreme Bench of the nation, and he declined a like offer from President John Ouincy Adams."

He was cautious, conservative and firm. Chief Justice Robertson said that "no man contributed more than Judge Boyle to establish the true authoritativeness of judicial decisions, to elevate the true dignity, and to inspire confidence in the purity of the judiciary department of the government, and to settle on the stable basis of judicial authority, the legal code of Kentucky."

The two associate judges were William Owsley, afterwards governor, and Benjamin Mills. "No more honored names appear upon the resplendant pages of Kentucky's annals, no truer or braver men can be found in the world's history."

"This famous trio composed the Supreme Court during the most exciting period of its history. Had Boyle and his associates never done anything other than to declare the law during the bitterly antagonistic conflict between the "Relief" and "Anti-Relief" parties, their names would still have filled most important places in Kentucky history — for they acted as guardians when the dignity of the State was threatened, the power of the law defied, and the constitution of the United States disregarded."

"Boyle was a man of singularly modest and unassuming nature, but we may well dismiss as apocryphal the suggestion which has been made, that he declined "offers of advancement" because of diffidence respecting his ability to worthily fill the place. Man is not given a brain like John Boyle's, without knowledge of his gifts. We may assume that his declination was, as the family tradition runs, because of the need of his growing family, and the inadequacy of a salary of nine hundred dollars a year, for their proper support and education in Washington. The claims of family were imperative to a husband and father as devoted as Boyle."

"It is perhaps as well for him, and his fame, that he devoted his powers to the service of his state ; it is certainly better for the state."

"When first called to the Bench, he had been in the regular practice of the law but five years, to which may be added such practice as he was able to care for, during the six years of his Congressional service, and the brief period of preparation for admission to the bar. It seems hardly credible that his legal attainments acquired in such a period, and under those circumstances, could have been very extensive in scope. But his knowledge was exact, scientific, ready, and grew with his growth. The principles of the common law system of pleading, he understood thoroughly."

"But in the better sense, Boyle was a pioneer of the law. He applied established principles to new facts, and adjusted new conditions to the fixed rules of justice. More than any other man in Kentucky, he established the authority and dignity of judicial decision, and was to the jurisprudence of Kentucky what Marshall was to that of the United States."

"He possessed a peculiarly lucid and pleasing legal style. It was usually a model of judicial English. His touch was sure from the beginning. He was concise without being stiff. Cases abound where in one or two sentences, he stated all the facts, and all of the procedure in the lower court, necessary to a perfect understanding of the legal questions involved. Many entire opinions are compressed into the space of from ten to twenty short lines. But he was no slave to conciseness. With all the language at his command, he used all that was necessary to express what he meant."

"While in his own phrase, he always used appropriate language with technical precision, in relation to subjects belonging to his art, he was not above using the expressive vernacular of his day, to state a fact; as where, after stating the fear of Indians, which existed in a certain locality, he says that some of the inhabitants "stayed forted for their mutual safety and protection" (Hazelrigs v. Amos, i Bibb, 426), or that the disputants "dogged the plaintiff's mare in the pasture of a defendant, not inclosed with a lawful fence," (Evans v. Hesler, i Bibb, 561), or that the "old rule in slander of construing words in mitiori sensu has been long since exploded, and has given way to one which accords more with reason, and the common sense of mankind." (Logan v. Steele, I Bibb, 594.)

"He sometimes applied his common knowledge of men and things, as when he disposed of the question whether an application for a new trial should have been granted, based on the absence in Missouri of the sole witness known to the defendant, by whom he could prove that the market price of whiskey in Mercer county, delivered in good barrels on the river, was only two shillings and sixpence per gallon. Said the Chief Justice: 'From the very nature of the thing, either the fact that the defendant states that he could prove by the absent witness was not true, or that he might with the most ordinary diligence, have discovered other witnesses, by whom it could be established. For it is impossible to believe that the current market price of whiskey should not have been diffusively known.' (Ripperdam v. Scott, i Mar. 152.) When wearied by counsel's contention against an established rule of pleading, he said : 'We do not feel disposed to incur the censure of a vain ostentation of learning in citing the numerous authorities which recognize the rule. It is coeval with the science of written pleadings, and its recognition is to be found in every book which treats of the subject of pleas, and pleading.' (^Metcalf v. Standeford, i Bibb, 619.)

"While a common law pleader, and technical where technicalities were part of the logical system necessary to the certainty and effectiveness of the great legal machine, with fine scorn he swept aside useless formalities. 'Formerly' he said, 'much ceremony, and great prolixity of pleading were used in bringing a suit in chancery, to issue. If the defendant, by his plea or answer, offered any new matter in avoidance of the charges in the bill, a special replication was thought to be necessary ; to this succeeded the rejoinder of the defendant, by which he asserted the truth and sufficiency of his answer, and traversed every material part of the replication; to the rejoinder, the plaintiff might surrejoin; to the surrejoinder, the defendant in his turn might rebut, and so on; protracting the pleadings through a labyrinth of forms, calculated greatly to enhance the expense of the litigants, but not in the slightest degree, conducive to the ends of justice. These idle, but expensive ceremonies, have given way to a more rational and intelligible system of pleading.' (Reading v. Ford, i Bibb, 388.)

"Speaking of the right of one who advanced money for the purchase of land warrants, as against any one with notice of his claim, 'so far as this argument derives any support from the supposed analogy between a right in equity, and an estate in fee, at law it is evidently fallacious. Its fallacy consists in the application of a principle, merely technical, to a species of right founded on the basis of moral justice. The maxim of the old common law, that the freehold could not be in suspense, or abeyance, was predicated upon the artificial principles of the ancient system of feuds, and grew out of the necessity, which, according to that system, there was of having a tenant always in possession, to perform the

feudal duties. But this rule has never, even in England, been applied to estates created by devise, or to conveyances under the statute of uses, which were introduced after the rigor of the feudal system had been in some measure abated. Much less ought it to be applied to a right in equity, unknown to that system, and founded upon principles of moral justice, and general utility.' (Patrick v. Marshall, 2 Bibb, 43.)

"When precedents failed, he applied rules drawn from an inexhaustible fund of common sense. For instance : 'A promise to pay as soon as the debtor can, is in the contemplation of law, a promise to pay presently. The law supposes every man able to pay his debts, and if the ability to pay was a question to be tried, the only practical mode of trial, is per execution, and of this it is not yet too late for the defendants in the court below to have full benefit.' (Kincaid v. Higgins, i Bibb, 397.)

"Also his ruling in a case where two States not only claimed, but exercised jurisdiction over territory in dispute, and a citizen of Virginia emigrating to Kentucky with his family and slaves, was induced, by fear of Indians, to sojourn for some years, but without abandoning his intention of proceeding to Kentucky, at a place in the disputed territory, which when the boundary was subsequently settled, proved to be several miles within the State of Pennsylvania. His slaves brought an action of trespass, assault and battery, and false imprisonment, against him, for the purpose of ascertaining the right to freedom, and a question of conflict of laws was presented. After the statement of facts, Judge Boyle's opinion proceeds : 'That different states or nations have at the same time claimed the empire of one and the same territory, is a circumstance that has not unfrequently happened. But no instance has been found, in the researches the court have had an opportunity of making, when both nations have been at the same time in possession of the territory in dispute, as was the case of Pennsylvania and Virginia with respect to the territory in which the appellant resided from the spring of the year 1781, until the fall of the year 1783. By what laws the conduct of the inhabitants of the disputed territory, thus simultaneously possessed by the citizens and officers of the two governments having conflicting claims to the sovereignty, ought to be regulated, and their rights to be decided, it is important in this case to ascertain. If the laws of Pennsylvania are to furnish the rule of decision in_ the present controversy, then it is clear that the appellees are entitled to their freedom ; but on the other hand, if the laws of Virginia are to be considered as furnishing the proper rules of decision, it is equally clear that the appellees must be deemed slaves. In the tribunals of those States, during the existence of the dispute, we would naturally expect to find the rights of the inhabitants decided upon, according to the laws of that State to which the tribunal might belong, without regard to those of the other State of which the inhabitants might respectively claim to be citizens. But what would have been the rule of decision is a question where the lex loci ought to govern, if such a question had been made with respect to the rights of an inhabitant of the disputed territory before the court of another State, it is not so easy to determine. It seems most agreeable to the dictates of natural justice, as well as of sound policy, that the conduct of the inhabitants during the existence of the dispute, should have been regulated, and, of course, ought always to be decided, according to the laws of the State of which they were respectively citizens, that is to say, the conduct of those claiming to be citizens of Pennsylvania, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, and the conduct of those claiming to be citizens of Virginia, according to the laws of Virginia. A private citizen must be supposed to be incompetent to decide which of the two States had the right of empire. He was bound to render obedience to the laws of the government whose citizen he was, and it is consonant to every principle of justice and policy, that he should have the benefit of the protection of those laws which he was bound to obey. The appellant in the present case was a citizen of Virginia, on his way from one undisputed part to another undisputed part of the territory of that State ; for the safety of his family from the savage enemy, he took up a temporary residence in the country claimed both by Virginia and Pennsylvania, from whence he removed prior to the settlement of the boundary line, and while its adjustment was in fieri between the two states. Under these circumstances, we can have but little hesitation in declaring that he was bound to obey the laws of Virginia, and in his turn, was entitled to the benefit of their protection.' (Hazelrigs v. Amos et al, i Bibb, 426.)

"Also his statement of the rule — at that time still unsettled — as to questioning the character of the plaintiff, in an action of slander : 'The general character of plaintiff cannot be questioned by plea ; it ought therefore, to be questioned by proof in mitigation of damages. The general character of the plaintiff must be considered as coming in, at least collaterally, upon the issue. It is laid in the declaration, as the inducement, and the injury to it, is the gist of the action. In the estimation of damages, the jury must take into consideration the general character of the plaintiff, and his standing in society. In this case, the defendant's counsel was permitted by the court to inquire into the plaintiff's general character, in relation to the facts put in issue, but we are of an opinion he ought to have been permitted to inquire into his general moral character, without relation to any particular species of immorality ; for a man who is habitually addicted to every vice except the one with which he is charged, is not entitled to as heavy damages as one possessing a fair moral character. The jury who possess a large and almost unbounded discretion upon subjects of this kind, could have but very inadequate data for the quantum of damages, if they are permitted to know only the plaintiff's general character in relation to the facts put in issue. This appears to us to be the only correct and rational rule upon the subject; for while it affords the jury a fair opportunity of weighing the injury, it cannot take the plaintiff by surprise, as every man is presumed prepared to show his general character.' (Eastland v. Caldwell, 2 Bibb, 24.)

"In stating the technical rules of law, or the more abstruse doctrines of equity, he wrote with a clearness which could come from nothing but clear vision, e. g., upon the old rule as to defenses cognizable both at law and in equity: 'Where matter of defense is purely legal, and the party neglects to avail himself of it, at law, it would be contrary to the soundest maxims of policy, to permit him afterwards to take advantage of it in equity. But if the defense be of such a nature that the party may avail himself of it, either at law or in chancery, though he should fail to make it at law, he might, nevertheless, resort to a court of equity, with the same propriety as a plaintiff seeking a remedy for an injury of which a court of law, and a court of equity have concurrent jurisdiction, may elect to which tribunal he will resort for relief. But, as in the latter case, when the election is once made, and a trial had in either of these courts, the party will be precluded forever from resorting to the other, so by a parity of reason in the former, the matter of defense once decided upon, in the one court, can never be retried in the other.' (Morrison v. Hart, 2 Bibb, 5.)

"Also as to mutual independent covenants : 'There can be no doubt that the judgment of the court below is correct. The payment of the price was not by the terms of the contract, made to depend upon the conveyance of the lot as a previous condition, and the covenant to pay the price, and that to convey the lot, being contained in different instruments, cannot be construed to be dependent covenants. The failure to convey, therefore, most indisputably could not, upon principles of the common law be pleaded in bar of an action brought upon the contract to pay the price ; nor can this be done under the statute authorizing a defendant in an action upon a specialty to go into, or impeach the consideration; for where there are mutual independent covenants, it is not the performance of the thing covenanted to be done, on the one side, but the covenant itself, which is the consideration of the covenant on the other side ; and therefore, the failure to perform the one covenant is no failure of the consideration of the other.' (Sanders V. Beal, 4 Bibb, 324.)"

In our form of government, disagreements sometimes arise between the State and federal judiciary. Several such occurred during Boyle's term, "and he met the difficulty with admirable discretion.

In the federal question of the constitutionality of the law creating the Bank of the United States, he yielded his own adverse opinion, and with his colleagues, adopted the ruling of the Supreme Court, as conclusive on all state courts. (Bank v. Norton, 3 Mar., 422.) But in matters of judicial procedure, or of the legislative policy of the state, he affirmed the right of the state to maintain its own system, though the federal courts might adopt a different rule.

"Thus, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision to the contrary, and though his only colleague yielded to that authority, Boyle adhered to the Kentucky rule, and held that actual seizin, or personal entry, was necessary to the maintenance of a writ of right, and that seizin in law was insufficient." (Speed v. Buford, 3 Bibb, 57-)

"And he concurred in holding that the occupying claimant law, securing to bona fide occupants before eviction, a prescribed compensation for improvements, was not in conflict with the compact with Virginia, though three of the seven judges of the Supreme Court, had held otherwise." (Bodley v. Gaither, 3 Mon., 57-)

"Boyle had been for some thirteen years in a place made for him — a place which he fitted. In ordinary times, and under ordinary conditions, he would have been a great judge. That was conceded to him long before the day of his trial, when through much tribulation, he came to a haven of rest."

"The crowning achievement of his life, was his triumphant self vindication, at the conclusion of the Old and New Court controversy, the bitterness of which was probably unsurpassed in Kentucky, even by that engendered by the Civil War."

It may be better understood from a brief review of the financial and political conditions then prevailing in the State. The Napoleonic wars resulted in an excessively inflated paper currency and prices were enormously enhanced, in all commercial communities. The precious metals were hoarded and ceased to circulate as money. When peace returned, followed by a more or less arbitrary resumption of specie payments, the contraction of the medium of exchange necessarily resulted in a tremendous fall in prices. In Kentucky, the conditions were aggravated, at the Legislative session of 1817-18, by the charter of forty independent banks, having an authorized capital of about ten millions of dollars, with the privilege to redeem their notes either in specie, or in notes of the Bank of Kentucky, which had then resumed specie payment. As the paper of these banks went into circulation, prices advanced, and a wave of speculation swept over the State. The ventures were uniformly and speedily disastrous, the markets fell, but the obligations remained unreduced. The pressure of debt became so burdensome, that at the Legislative session of 1819-20, the three months' time for which judgments might be replevied, was extended to one year. In 1820, the distress of the debtor class became terrible. General Adair was chosen governor, and at the ensuing legislative session, the Bank of the Commonwealth was chartered, and was not required to redeem its notes in specie. By an Act of that session, the judgment creditor was subjected to a stay of two years, on the debtor's giving bond with security, unless the creditor should endorse on his execution, a willingness to accept notes on the Bank of Kentucky, or the Bank of the Commonwealth, and by its terms, the Act applied to debts already incurred. By the exercise of the legislative powers, under the charter of the Bank of Kentucky, to elect its directors, a directory was chosen, pledged to accept in payment of debts due the bank, the paper of the Bank of the Commonwealth. This, instead of strengthening the latter bank, resulted in depreciating its notes fifty per cent, and more, and broug'ht down the value of the paper issued by the Bank of Kentucky. The creditor "had his choice of two evils. One was to receive nothing at all for two years, and at the end of that time to do the best he could — running the risk of new delays at the end of that time, and of the bankruptcy of his securities."

"The indignation of the creditors, and the distress of the debtors, caused the people of Kentucky to forget their former political alliances, throw ofif their party ties, and divide into the relief and anti-relief parties. These parties were led by such men as George M. Bibb, who had preceded Boyle as chief Justice ; John Rowan, who had been a judge of the Court of Appeals; Solomon P. Sharp and William T. Barry, on the rehef side, and Robert Wicklifife of Fayette, George Robertson, who followed Boyle as chief justice, and Chilton Allen, of Clark, on the other.

"Circuit Judge Clark, of Clark county, promptly decided the stay law unconstitutional, and was summoned before a special session of the legislature, where it was proposed to remove him from office by Address. The effort failed for want of the two-thirds majority required by the constitution. His opinion was followed by Circuit Judge Blair of Fayette, and both parties awaited the decision of the Court of Appeals upon the question.

"The court then consisted of three judges. _ Boyle's colleagues were WilHam Owsley, who was appointed in April, 1812, and Benjamin Mills, who was appointed in February, 1820. Owsley, as a young man, had been assisted by Boyle in his legal education, and was his close friend. All these were men of great firmness and courage, qualities which were soon to be needed. Their decision was not awaited in silence. A great popular majority was in favor of the so-called relief laws, and firmly believed in both the power and the right of the legislature to adopt them. They had been so accustomed to talking and hearing talk of a Republican form of government, and of bowing to the will of the majority, that it was with something of a shock they learned that they must wait until three unassuming gentlemen on the bench, determined whether the will of the majority could constitutionally prevail. There were mutterings which grew to open threats of what would happen if the decision should be adverse to the popular will.

"No intimation came from the court, however, until October 8, 1823, when Chief Justice Boyle delivered the opinion in Blair V. Williams, followed on October 11, by the opinions of Judge Owsley in Lapsley v. Brashears, and of Judge Mills in both cases. (4 Litt., 34, 46, 65.) The court held that in the clause of the federal 'Constitution which forbids a state to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, the obligation referred to, is not one arising from or dependent on conscience,' for the obligation dependant upon conscience alone, is obviously beyond the reach of human legislation, 'but is the legal obligation, or remedy whereby the performance of the contract may be enforced, because legislation cannot impair the legal obligations of contracts otherwise than by operating on legal remedies for their enforcement.'

"In the opinion of Chief Justice Boyle: 'It is, then, the remedy allowed by law in force at the date of the contract, being that on the faith of which the contract was made, which constitutes its obligation ; and it consequently results, that the remedy which was allowed by law upon the contract between the parties in this case, on the 19th of November, 1819, the date of the contract, is its obligation.

" 'Does, then, the Act of the Assembly in question, impair that obligation ? By the law as it stood on the date of the contract the defendants were allowed to replevy the debt but for three months only, and the money, if not then paid, was required to be made of their estate, without further delay ; but by the Act in question, they were allowed to replevy the debt two years, or enter into a recognizance for the payment of the money within that time. And surely it cannot require argument to prove that the latter Act impairs the obligation imposed by the former law. Indeed, the avowed object of the Act in question, was to relieve the debtor from the obligation he was under, to pay his debt in the time prescribed by the former law, and give him further time of payment ; and according to any sense of the word, the Act in question must impair the obligation imposed by the former law, and is therefore unconstitutional and void, as it relates to the contract between the parties in this case, as well as to all contracts made previous to the passage of the Act.'

"Then," as Judge Du Relle, afterwards a distinguished associate on that bench, in his Life of Boyle, has written, "the storm broke. The decision produced the greatest exasperation in the relief party. The judges were denounced as usurpers, tyrants, self-made kings — and charged with arrogating to themselves supreme power. Their authority to declare a legislative act unconstitutional, and to disregard it on that ground, was bitterly and violently denied. While the judges were publicly denounced for their decision, on the stump and in the press. Judge Bibb, who appeared on the relief side, in Blair v. Williams, against Wickliffe on the other, filed a petition for a rehearing in both cases. Haggin, Barry and Rowan were his colleagues in Lapsley v. Brashears, and Harrison and Breckenridge appeared with Wickliffe. At this day, the question seems easy enough of solution. Since the victory was won, popular thought as well as legal, has crystallized in the form then determined. But to form a really just judgment of the question, as it then appeared, it would be necessary to go back and consider the forgotten arguments of the defeated side. The lost cause has few apologists, and the reasons which seemed weighty enough to bring the scales to a balance, are dropped and discarded when the issue is once decided. The court itself was not unanimous at the outset. There are few things connected with the controversy more striking than the manful statement of Judge Mills, at the conclusion of his opinion, when, in defiance of public clamor, he abandoned the side of the majority: "Such is the conclusion to which my mind has come on this litigated question, after the most mature deliberations and research, and I am bound by my oath, and official duty, to express it. I am free to confess that it is different from the opinion which, when yielding without investigation, to the practice of the day, I once entertained. To adhere to an error when convinced, is odious ; to retract it is praiseworthy and magnanimous, and I hesitate not to choose the latter course." '

"A skeleton of the arguments which seemed plausible, if not convincing, to those who owed debts, and were unable to pay, may be found in Judge Bibb's petition for rehearing. Those arguments were amplified, elaborated and reiterated, in the speeches and manifestoes of the time.

"The relief party represented that under the court's ruling, a law giving a more speedy and efficacious remedy to the creditor, was not prohibited, but was void if the remedy were more favorable to the debtor. They claimed that the remedy was not part of the obligation, but the effect and consequence of it— something which flowed out of it; that it had been frequently held that the statute of limitations operated only upon the remedy, and not upon the right, and that it did not destroy the right, but merely withheld the remedy ; that consequently the redress must be sought within the time fixed by the lex fori, and not within that fixed by the lex contractus, and that the limitation period might be altered by the legislature; that the mode of redress was governed by the law of the place where redress was sought, even if such law permitted the arrest of the debtor's body, which was not allowed by the law of the place where the obligation was created; that the remedy must be according to the law of the forum to which application was made, and in conformity to the rules there prescribed; that remedy was a subject of legislative discretion; that a summary and more expeditious remedy might be given by statute upon obligations theretofore created, as had been held by the Court of Appeals with Judge Boyle upon the bench, which court had also held that a statute might constitutionally subject lands to execution for debts before contracted ; that the force which, in a state of nature, a party might use to exact performance of an obligation, had been surrendered to society, whose aggregate force was substituted therefor, and that the individual had no right to deny to society the right to modify the mode of exercising its aggregate ; and that as has been held by the Supreme Court, in an opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, the distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, existed in the nature of things, and without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy might certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation should direct. These were some of the arguments advanced in support of the proposition that alterations in executive laws, process, and courts do not impair the obligation of contracts."

"At the legislative session in the fall of 1823, pending the petition for rehearing, the question was taken up. Resolutions were introduced in the legislature, and printed, in which, after twenty-six pages of most inflammatory preamble, the legislature most solemnly protested against the doctrines promulgated in the decision 'as ruinous in their practical effects, to the good people of this Commonwealth, and subversive of their dearest and most invaluable political rights,' and resolved 'that if the decision should not by the court be reviewed or reversed, but should be attempted to be enforced upon the good people of this Commonwealth, the legislature cannot, ought not, and will not furnish any facilities for its enforcement.' Also 'that any effort which the legislature may feel it a duty to make for the contravention of the erroneous doctrine of that decision, ought not to interfere with, or obstruct the administration of justice according to the existing laws, which, whether they were, or were not, expedient, are believed to be constitutional and valid; and which should, when it shall be thought expedient to do so, be repealed by the legislature, and not by the Appellate Court.' "

On December 4, 1823, the petition for rehearing was overruled. The same day, George Robertson, the speaker, attacked the resolutions in an address covering some twenty-four closely printed pages of "flawless logic, superb and stately rhetoric, and biting allusions."

On December 19 the House adopted the resolutions.

The constitution of 1799, provided that the judicial powers of the Commonwealth should be vested in a Supreme Court, styled the Court of Appeals, and in such inferior courts as the General Assembly might authorize from time to time. It provided that the judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, should hold their office during good behavior, but for any reasonable cause, though not sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor should remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of each House of the General Assembly ; and further provided that the cause of the removal should be stated at length in such address, and on the Journal of each House. The constitution did not prohibit the Iegislature from reducing judicial salaries. The Court of Appeals was a constitutional court, therefore, and could not be constitutionally abolished. Its judges could only be removed by impeachment or by address. "Nor was it possible, without violating the spirit of the constitution, to starve them out of office, for the constitution provided that they should, at stated times, receive for their services, an adequate compensation to be fixed by law."

No ground for impeachment existed. The campaign of 1824 for governor, and for the General Assembly, was really for the removal of the judges by address. General Joseph Desha, "a man of great energy and partisanship," was, by an overwhelming vote, chosen governor by the relief party, which also by a large majority controlled both houses of the General Assembly. The judges were summoned before the bar of the legislature, to show cause against their removal, and stated at length the ground of their decisions. Barry, Bibb and Rowan replied elaborately. Resolutions for their removal by address passed the House by sixty-one to thirty-nine, every member voting. Though large, the majority fell short of the constitutional two-thirds. Meanwhile, the senate had passed an Act to repeal the law organizing the Court of Appeals, and to reorganize a Court of Appeals, by which all acts establishing that court, and every act, or part of any act, or acts, concerning it, "or for giving or allowing any salary or compensation to the Chief Justice of Kentucky, or any Judge or Justice of the Court of Appeals," were repealed, "and another Court of Appeals was attempted to be established, and the governor authorized to appoint four judges thereof. The bill was debated in the House over three days and nights. The excitement was intense. The speech of Mr. Wickliffe was a marvel of withering invective. Robertson delivered an elaborate address. The Governor and Lieutenant Governor were present on the floor of the House, urging the adoption of the bill."

The argument against the bill was its unconstitutionality, as an attempt under the guise of reorganization, to abolish a constitutional court, and by indirection to accomplish by a bare majority what the constitution required should be done by a two-thirds vote, on impeachment or by address.

A principal argument in support of the bill was made by comparing the proposed action with that of Congress, in adopting the Judiciary Act, by which the law establishing Circuit Courts, enacted near the close of Adams' administration, was repealed. That argument was fallacious, as in the debate upon that bill, it was unanimously conceded that the Supreme Court, created by the Constitution, could not be abolished by Congress.

The discussion grew exceedingly vehement, and the ordinary courtesies of parliamentary debate were disregarded.

"Shylocks and Silver-heels, on one side, and Judge-breakers on the other, were among the milder forms of epithets," used ; indeed, the governor and his party seem to have adopted as a slogan the title of Judge-breaker, which had been first used as a term of reproach.

"At midnight, on December 23, 1824, amid great tumult, the House concurred in the bill. The old court party appealed to the people."

A brief but fervent protest was issued by the minority of the General Assembly.

The new court was organized, Barry, Chief Justice, with Trimble, Haggin and Davidge associates. The clerk of that court, Francis P. Blair, obtained possession of the records by force, and the court proceeded to decide cases, the first opinion being delivered April 19, 1825.

Boyle and his associates denied the constitutionality of the Act creating the new court, and continued to hear such cases as were brought before them. The records having been forcibly seized by the clerk of the new court, no decision appears to have been rendered by the old court at the Spring term of 1825, although in 3 Monroe, one opinion appears under the heading "Spring Term 1825," but it was delivered October 15, preceding.

"Curiously enough Judge Bibb was the counsel who filed a petition for rehearing in the case which was overruled." The new court, in possession of the records, delivered fifty-two opinions of the Spring term.

With great unanimity the bar adhered to the old court, and the great majority of the circuit judges obeyed its mandates. Some circuit judges recognized the new court, and a few recognized both tribunals.

"Meanwhile the campaign of 1825 was waged with great activity, and unexampled bitterness. The parties had been rechristened, and when not referred to in terms of opprobrium, were now known as the Old, and the New Court parties. The result was an overwhelming victory for the Old Court party, a result which is a little surprising under the circumstances, with the passions of the people excited as they were, until we consider the great though quiet influence which must have been exerted by the practical unanimity of the circuit court bench and bar. One contributing factor which cannot be overlooked in reading the popular addresses and writings of the times, was the personal character of Boyle, and in a less degree, because less known, of his associates. As a result of the popular vote, there were but twenty opinions delivered by the new court at the Fall Term."

"Although the old court controlled the House by a large majority, but one-third of the senators were chosen at that election — and the senate was equally divided, with the casting vote of the Lieutenant Governor, on the side of the new court. A Bill to repeal the reorganizing Act, sent up by the House, was rejected by the senate. Various compromises were proposed by the New Court party, some providing for the continuance of the old judges in office, with Boyle as Chief Justice, but as all involved by implication, a recognition of the constitutionality of the reorganization act, Boyle and his party steadfastly refused them.

"After the legislature convened, the new court ceased to do business, but refused to surrender the records, or to permit parties or counsel to have access to them. Their clerk's office was guarded by armed men, and as the House adopted a resolution that it was the duty of the old court, through its sergeant-at-arms, to regain possession of its records, a hostile encounter was avoided with difficulty. The legislature adjourned, and an appeal to the people was again necessary. Each party had its newspaper organ, which was filled with abuse of its opponents. The tide of public opinion had turned permanently against the New Court party. At the session of 1826, the senate, like the house, was in favor of the Old Court, and on December 30, 1826, an Act passed both houses, the governor's objections notwithstanding, 'to remove the unconstitutional obstructions which have been thrown in the way of the Court of Appeals.' The salaries of the old judges for the time they had served without salary were voted to them, and the old court proceeded in the discharge 'of its duties, and since that time, the decisions of the new court, which are printed in 2d Monroe, have never been recognized as vaHd."

Note — Judge Boyle Hved on a fertile tract of some hundred acres, with a large family, including grandchildren, and with slaves sufficiently numerous to cultivate his fields.

Within the holiday season of 1823-4, his own and other girls were playing before an open hearth, when a doll's dress caught fire. A girl seizing it, ran out upon the lawn. Waving the toy in a frantic effort to extinguish the flame, it escaped her grasp, and lodging on the roof, the whole was soon burning. The woodwork of the solid brick mansion was totally consumed, except such parts as could be hastily detached. The next season it was rebuilt, the family finding shelter meanwhile in the old log house which had not yet been removed.

This extraordinary draft upon his resources, coming at such a period of financial stringency, and being soon followed by the suspension of his salary, the family straits became severe. My father described their condition. Sugar and coffee were luxuries indeed, and many conveniences obtainable only by purchase, were conspicuously absent. The farm supplied the indispensable food of the large family of whites and blacks. Flax and hemp were grown — the mother led her daughters and the young negro women in the art of carding, spinning, weaving and dyeing — of cutting and sewing, and thus the clothing of the children and servants was provided during that long period of privation. But it was a serious question how to supply the head of the family with the means necessary to maintain the dignity of his official station.

"The whole controversy was excessively distasteful to Boyle, who possessed quiet tastes. Only a high sense of duty, which in him was religious, induced him to retain his seat upon the bench during that trying period."

"Chief Justice Robertson said of him : 'He never sought office, he never shrank from duty.' It had been for some time his intention to retire as soon as the controversy should be finally settled, and it was virtually settled by the election of the old court senate."

Chief Justice Boyle had determined to resign as soon as he could do so, without being unfaithful to the constitution, and without sacrificing his own honor. When the August election of 1826, indicated the triumph of constitutional law, at the earliest moment, November 8, 1826, he resigned. Chief Justice Robertson reports that he said to his countrymen :

"Persecuted and abused for honestly maintaining the best interests of yourselves and your children, and for helping to save your constitution, I now voluntarily resign, and with alacrity, the most important office in your gift — an office full of labor and responsibility, and to the duties of which I have dedicated the prime of my life — an office which I never sought, and the profits of which have been barely sufficient to feed my wife and children — an office in which I have grown gray, and from which I retire at last, much poorer in consequence of having held it so long."

Anticipating his resignation, the president appointed him Judge of the United States District Court of Kentucky. Although it never suited him, under persuasion, he accepted, and held the position during the remainder of his life. When not officially occupied, his time was devoted to the teaching of law, to study, and to agriculture.

On May 29, 1829, he was chosen Dean of the Transylvania University Law School, which he formally accepted August 28, the term to begin the first Monday in December, and extend to April 15, 1830. Mr. Clay, Dr. Breckenridge and R. H. Chinn, Esq., were a committee appointed to make the school known through the newspapers. At the December meeting the Board prepared a report to be submitted to the legislature, on the condition of the University. Boyle was organizing the law course, and the report said :

"It would be an act of supererogation to speak of the prospects of this Department, after having mentioned the name of the professor."

Resigning the position after a year, he passed the remainder of his life, discharging his official duties, and enjoying his domestic comforts.

"During the fatal spread of cholera in 1833, his devoted wife was taken away. Their married life had been peculiarly happy. He never recovered his spirits, but spoke hopefully of his own approaching death. He died surrounded by his younger children, his good old servants, and friends. As the end approached, he said to his physician : 'Doctor, I am dying,' and then, as if he had looked backward over the record of his life of labor and usefulness, he added, 'I have Hved for my country.' "

^ote — I am indebted to various sources for the foregoing sketches— to Chief Justice Robertson— most largely to Honorable George Du Relle— and to William Kavanaugh Doty, who published an interesting account of Chief Justice Boyle in the December, 1906, number of the "Transylvanian," the Kentucky University magazine. Literal quotations are so numerous, that it was thought best to acknowledge their sources, in this general way. Where possible without being too lengthy, the exact language is used, but where abbreviations seemed best, they appear. And I append the encomiums upon the character of Boyle, written by Chief Justice George Robertson, who was one of the most brilliant and capable jurists this country has known.

"His reported opinions are equal in most, if not in all, respects, with those of any other judge, ancient or modern, and will associate his name, in after times, with those of the Hales and the Eldons of England, and the Kents and Marshalls of America." — Robertson's Scrap Book, 220.

"His death was followed by no sepulchral honors or post mortuary testimonial. Nor has either marble or canvas, chisel or pencil, preserved any trace of his person. He desired none of the empty pageantry of mock sorrow — his memory needed no perishable memorial. Like old Cato, he built his own monument, and one far more honorable and enduring than any marble cenotaph, or granite column. Personal reminiscences of the most revered of our race, moulder with their bodies, and are soon buried forever with the dying generation that knew and loved them — their deeds and their virtues alone, may be embalmed for ages. Boyle's illustrious deeds and rare virtues, if faithfully recorded and transmitted, will be long and gratefully remembered by approving posterity, and should a Tacitus ever become his biographer, his name will be as immortal and at least as much honored as was that of Agricola."

"The life of John Boyle exhibits a practical illustration of all the nobler and more useful virtues of our race. No man was ever more chaste and upright in the whole tenor of his conduct ; he had no selfish pride, or sinister ambition ; he was punctiliously just and truthful; he was as frank and guileless as an artless child untutored in the arts and ways of social life ; his humility was most amiable, and his benevolence unsurpassed. He always spoke as he thought, and acted as he felt — and his sentiments were pure and honorable and almost always right.

"He devoted his life to the cultivation of his moral and intellectual faculties, and all those faculties were dedicated to the honest and useful service of his fellow men, his family and his country. He was a patriot and benefactor in a pure and comprehensive sense. His heart was his country's — his head was his country's — his hand was his country's — his whole life was full of philanthropy and lofty patriotism — and his example, altogether blameless and beneficent, presents a full-orbed and spotless model, worthy of all imitation.

"In contemplating his character we see nothing to condemn — much to admire.

"As a lawyer, he was candid, conscientious and faithful — as a statesman, honest, disinterested and patriotic — as a judge, pure, impartial and enlightened — as a citizen, upright, just and faultless — as a neighbor, kind, affable, and condescending — as a man, chaste, modest and benignant — as a husband, most constant, affectionate and devoted.

"We have heard his amiable and excellent wife declare, in his presence, not longer than a year before her death, that not-withstanding all the cares and crosses of domestic life, there had never been a sour look, a harsh word, or a hard thought between them, from the eventful moment when their destinies were linked together at the altar ! And knowing them both, as we did, we doubt not that she told the truth.

"Such is a brief outline of the life and character of one of the best and greatest of men, hastily and imperfectly sketched by one who knew him long and well, and who feels too much respect for his virtues, and reverence for his memory, to exaggerate or disguise the truth of faithful biography, with any embellishment of empty paregyric." — Chief Justice Robertson, Scrap Book, 225.

"John Boyle (was) the son of one of the earliest and bravest of the pioneers, and perhaps the most acute metaphysician of all our jurists." — T. M. Green, Historic FamiUes, 284.

HI— John Boyle, son of Major John Boyle, married, Mercer county, August 10, 1797, Rev. David Rice officiating, Elizabeth Tilford, daughter of Jeremiah Tilford and Sally Weir. She was born in Virginia in 1779, and died in June, 1833 (page 138). Issue : I— Arethusa, b. Sept. 14, 1798; d. Mercer Co., Dec. 12, 1818. II— Theresa, b. June 3, 1801 ; d. Mercer Co., Oct. 18, 1825. III— Almira, b. Jan. 10, 1803 ; d. Garrard Co., Oct. 20, 1807. IV— Malcolm, b. Feb. 26, 1807; d. Garrard Co., June 6, 1813. V— James Madison, b. Mar. 18, 1809; d. St. Louis, Oct. 10, 1892. VI— Marmontel, b. May 26, 181 1 ; d. in Cal., 1851. VII— Ellen, b. Nov. 22, 1812; d. Crawford Co., Ill, 1844. VIII— John Weir, b. Oct. 19, 1815; d. Fayette Co., Nov., 1845. IX— Jeremiah Tilford, b. May 22, 1818; d. Louisville, July 29, 1871. X— Henry P. S., b. Oct. 11, 1821 ; d. Crawford Co., 111.,

1846. Not married. Elizabeth Tilford Boyle was brought to Kentucky in 1781. She was cutting teeth, and in her agony, cried aloud, as the party traversed the Wilderness Road. Indian sign being numerous, a council of the leaders considered the advisability of putting her to death, fearing her cries might attract the savages, to the common destruction of the party ! She was spared, for her mother clasping her babe to her bosom, declared to the "Council of War" that they must first kill her !

This fact was related by her brother, Robert, at my last visit to him, in July, 1871. He then lived on the place once owned by their father, who bought it from Major John Boyle, where John Boyle and Elizabeth Tilford were married, and Judge Boyle bought it in 1814. My father was born there, during a visit of his mother to her parents, March 18, 1809. There Judge Boyle and his wife died, and Robert Tilford, who was born there in 1788, purchased it from the executors of Judge Boyle, and thereafter lived and died there.

• Reference: MyHeritage Family Trees - SmartCopy: Dec 14 2017, 18:44:18 UTC