Battle of Rooilaagte - 25 November 1899

Lord Methuen

Generaal Prinsloo

Gnl. De La Rey

Gnl. Piet Cronje ____________________

Boers fall back on Rooilaagte—De la Rey assumes real command—Boers repulse charge of naval Brigade—Contrast between British and Boer treatment of prisoners—Cronje joins De la Rey—Sketch of General Cronje—Boer position at Modder River—Repulse of British Guardsmen—Ineffectiveness of British artillery—Prinsloo's retreat causes loss of battle—de la Rey's report—British bayonet wounded Boers—Report of Dr. Lever on British abuse of Red Cross service—London "Globe's" comparison of British looting with Boer discipline.

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The battle has three names – Graspan, Enslin or Rooilaagte – after the three small communities close to the battlefield. Graspan and Enslin are both on the railway line, while Rooilaagte was just north of the main Boer positions.

The Naval Brigade was not as prepared for modern warfare as the army. While the soldiers had learnt to spread out, and their officers to be as inconspicuous as possible, at Rooilaagte the Marines would advance in relatively close formation (four feet between in man, compared to eight for the soldiers), with their officers leading the way, swords in hand. The Marine contingent lost almost every officer during the battle.

Meuthen selected the Boer left (eastern flank) as the point of attack. The 190 marines and 55 sailors of the Naval Brigade were supported by a company of the North Lancashire regiment, bring the total number of men in the first wave to 330. The Yorkshire Light Infantry followed close behind. They advanced to within 600 yards of the base of the hill before the Boers opened fire. As well as coming under fire from the top of the hill, the advancing British were also exposed to a fire from their left, where a number of Boers had been forced off the hilltop by artillery fire. This level fire proved to be very effective. The Boers modern Mauser rifles had a flat trajectory, which proved to be more effective on level ground than when fired from above. De la Rey would learn from this experience at Rooilaagte, and base his plans at the Modder River and Magersfontein on it.

At Rooilaagte the British once again proved that the steep sided kopjes were not great defensive positions. Once they reached the base of the hills, the survivors of the advance were able to take shelter, and then slowly advance up the side of the hill in a series of short dashes. When they finally reached the top, the Boers had gone, retreating before they could be caught. With the high ground at the east of their position taken, the Boer line was exposed, and a general retreat followed. Once again, Methuen did not have enough cavalry to pursue properly, and the bulk of the Boer forces escaped.

Prinsloo was the main Boer casualty. After the battle his men lost confidence in his ability, and he was replaced by Piet Cronjé. De la Rey remained as his advisor, a relationship that would cause much tension. Boer losses at Rooilaagte were low – 21 bodies were found by the British. British losses were much higher. The Naval Brigade suffered especially badly – the Marines lost 11 dead and 73 wounded, 44% of their strength. Total British losses came to 283 men. Once again the determination of the British troops had won Methuen a battle. He was now convinced that the only real barrier between him and the successful relieve of Kimberly would be the hills at Magersfontein. On 28 November he would get a very nasty surprise at the Modder River.

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An English version of this incident, given by the " Daily Chronicle " war correspondent, reads as follows:

" While the Argylls were pushing across the river they were fired upon from the house and several fell, whereupon a dozen of the Highlanders stormed the house, and, tho the enemy hoisted the white flag, no quarter was given. They were all shot. The enemy had acted most unscrupulously, shelling our field hospital, so that some of our wounded were killed, and repeatedly firing on our stretcher parties."

The Boer officer who repeated the facts to me was confident that the deed was done, not by Highlanders, but by Guards, as related. The counter allegation made by the " Chronicle " correspondent is given here in order to have both sides heard. The other charges made by the Boers have not been denied. There has not been a duly authenticated instance of an ambulance or Red Cross outrage committed by the Boer forces established, even by English testimony, throughout the whole war.

On the morning following the battle seven doctors and thirty attendants were busy dressing the wounds of some Boers in some houses east of the hotel, where the Transvaalers had held the river bank against the attacks of the Guards. The Red Cross flag was exposed, and two or three ambulance carts, also bearing the Cross, were near by. An English officer arrived with troops, and arrested all the doctors and their attendants, and claimed the wounded as prisoners. Remonstrance was of no avail. The doctors gave their names and addresses, but they were told " it would all be inquired into," and were forbidden to attend to the wounded. This treatment continued during Wednesday and Thursday. On the evening of that day all the medical staff were ordered to board the train for Cape Town as prisoners. During the journey to De Aar, one of the wounded claimed the attention of the doctors. They were not allowed to go near him; the officer to whom the request was made replied: "Let the Boer die!" They were locked up in filthy cells during a night's stay at De Aar; the prison guard being instructed by this same officer: " You kick them if they move, and shoot them if they come near the door." Dr. Charles J. Lever published an account of their subsequent treatment by the British, from which I take the following extract:

" We arrived at Cape Town, after a wearisome journey, on Monday, at noon, and were taken to the New Military Hospital, or prison, where we were detained. The Commandant expressed his opinion to the effect that a huge blunder had occurred, and we were ordered to be in readiness to leave by the 9 o'clock train that night. We were marched from the docks to the railway station and sent back to Modder River.

" I do not attempt to describe the indignities or the inconvenience to which we were subjected. Suffice it to say that traveling in cattle trucks, confinement in that most delectable jail at De Aar, gratuitous impertinence from sundry officers and minor details of heat, dirt, and general discomfort, were the main features of our journey.

" We were captured without any assigned reason, returned with the consolation that a huge blunder had been made, and it is now for the civilized world to comment and for high authorities to adjudicate upon the unwarrantable treatment accorded by the British military authorities to the members of an ambulance staff, working in the most sacred interests of humanity, under the recognized auspices of the Geneva Convention.—I am, etc.,

" Charles J. Levee.

" P.S.—I may further mention that, on our return to Modder River, restitution of our ambulance wagons, cattle, horses, etc., was refused, and we had to make our way to our own lines on foot, a distance of some nine miles.

" Jacobsdal, Orange Free State, December 10, 1899."

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How to cite this article: Rickard, J (12 February 2007), Battle of Rooilaagte, 25 November 1899, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_rooilaagte.html

Davitt: Chapter XVIII - Battles Of Rooilaagte (Enslin) And Modder River https://www.angloboerwar.com/books/37-davitt-boer-fight-for-freedom...