Follow
THE OCCUPATION OF ICELAND
• The invasion of Iceland initially took place on 10th May 1940, though the news of this strategic -indeed key, move was sidelined by the German invasion of France and the Low Countries the same date.
• The invasion was carried out by “Force Sturges”, which consisted of two warships and a Battalion of Royal Marines. The events and strategic considerations involved in occupying the country may be introduced from the Military War Diaries for the period 1940 – 1942. Thomas Barron Walker, 11th Bat. Durham Light Infantry [11 DLI.] was a soldier in the British garrison for much of that time.
LOCATION OF ICELAND
Iceland, a small island country with a population of about 120,000, was determined to remain neutral in 1939, as it had been since the First World War. But being strategically located in the North Atlantic between Greenland and the Faroe Islands, just south of the Arctic Circle, it was of interest to Germany and Britain. According to an unidentified German naval officer, “whoever has Iceland controls the entrances into and exits from the Atlantic.”
THE BACKGROUND TO ITS OCCUPATION
At 2:15pm on 10th May 1940 an immediate coded telegram – Ref. 729(R) was despatched to The Marquess of Lothian in Washington from the Foreign Office [F.O.] and read:-
“Following is substance of a communication made today to United States Charges d’Affaires. Since the German seizure of Denmark it had become necessary for His Majesty’s [H.M.'s] Government [Govt.] to reckon with the possibility of a sudden German descent upon Iceland. It was clear that in the face of an attack on Iceland, even on a very small scale, the Icelandic Govt. would be unable to prevent their country from falling completely into German hands. H.M.'s Govt. accordingly decided to preclude this possibility, which would deprive Iceland of her independence, by, themselves, landing a force in Iceland: that was done this morning. They have explicitly assured Icelandic Govt. that they are acting solely to ensure the security of Iceland against a German invasion, that the force will be withdrawn at the end of the war, and that they will not interfere with the administration of the island. They are also prepared to negotiate an agreement on trade matters which should bring material advantages to the inhabitants. Please inform Sec. of State.” The telegram is filed in U.K. National Archives [N.A.] Ref. WO 32/9630. °
° A diplomat – Mr Howard-Smith, who subsequently became the Britannic Minister on the island, accompanied the Force, and – after having reported his arrival by telegram – sent a second telegram No 69, to be found in N.A. Ref. WO 32/9630. The telegram was dispatched at 6:06pm. It was received for general distribution in London at 9:40 p.m. stating :-
"Following is text of Icelandic protest with regard to the happenings, which have taken place early this morning:
“With military occupation of Reykjavik whereby the neutrality of Iceland was flagrantly violated and its independence infringed, the Icelandic Govt. must recall the fact that on April 11th last they formally notified H.M.'s Govt. in the U.K. through their representative in this country of the attitude of the Icelandic Government towards their proposal to offer military protection to Iceland and in accordance therewith they protest vigorously against the violation exercised by the British military forces. It will be expected that compensation for losses and injuries resulting from the infraction of the lawful rights of Iceland as an independent neutral country will be made as a matter of course.” The file copy was annotated –by an unknown hand, with the note:- ‘Spoke F.O. (Sir John Dashwood) .. F.O. view is that this is a formal protest to cover themselves with the Germans. F.O. are going to send a soothing reply, but have to consult first [about the point made on compensation]’. °
COMMUNICATION FROM THE FORCE COMMANDER
In early 1941, having experienced their first Icelandic Winter, the General Officer Commanding Iceland (C)* Force, Major-General H.O. Curtis requested the War Office [W.O.] that Units in the Force be relieved on a regular basis. ° In an exchange of messages filed within N.A. Ref. WO 32/10208, Major-General Curtis’s request was denied in a personal note from the Sec. of State for War, as follows:-
“To my very deep regret circumstances make it impossible to carry out reliefs in the Iceland Force for the present. Your report to V.C.I.G.S. in your 0578 of 15/2 (assumed to mean 15th February) to the effect that your troops could carry through a second winter confirms my opinion that British troops are capable of maintaining their high morale in the most trying circumstances. Please convey to all ranks the following message from me. Quote- "Possibly the most trying circumstances in which an army can be placed are those where it is isolated from home and friends in a rigorous climate and confined to the monotonous role of watching and waiting. H.M.'s Govt. are thoroughly aware that Iceland Force is so placed and is fulfilling its role with fortitude and cheerfulness. The security of Iceland is of the first importance and I am confident that it is placed in trusty hands. To my deep regret it is impossible to relieve units as quickly as I had hoped but arrangements are being made for leave to be granted to the U.K. on as generous a scale as the necessity for keeping up the strength of the garrison admits." -Unquote. ° Major-General Curtis replied, “Most grateful thanks for your personal message and for inspiring one to all ranks. All much appreciate sentiments expressed and promise of leave. May I take this opportunity to say that all ranks are grateful for equipment, the excellent clothing, accommodation and rations which helped so much towards fitness during winter.” The Sec. of State had Major-General Curtis’s message of appreciation conveyed to all relevant Departments.
A few months later, Major-General Curtis requested two additional Infantry Battalions and a Field Battery of Artillery to add to Britain's Iceland Force. This was also refused in a message from the Sec. of State for War in London, dated 3rd May 1941. It is filed in N.A. Ref. WO32/10209 -once marked SECRET. The additional forces had been recommended by the Joint Planning Staff and supported by the Chiefs of Staff, subject to the W.O. being able to make the troops available. The W.O. objection was, firstly, to the allocation of “part” units – separating Infantry from their parent Brigade and Artillery from their Field Regiment, and secondly because all UK-based Units were being allocated special roles for invasion (it was not entirely clear whether this was in respect of roles to counter German invasion or to prepare for the invasion of Europe). It was also pointed out that air resources had been increased. The message then went on to describe the importance of aerodrome construction, and extension of the Havalfjordur Harbour and referred to Churchill’s interest in accelerating the completion of these projects, including (and this is highly relevant to 70th Brigade), expanding the number of troops employed in construction. Two further Pioneer Companies were being despatched to Iceland on 21st May 1941, with four more on standby should they be needed, dependent on a specialist survey looking at the potential use of mechanical equipment. Major-General Curtis was in effect being pressured into using a greater proportion of fighting troops for these projects – seen as vital to the Battle of the Atlantic.
At the end of November 1941, Iceland Force HQ and the HQ of Iceland Base Command (U.S. Forces) issued a joint set of instructions on Joint Operations between US and British Forces. This “Most Secret” Paper set out Missions and Tasks on dealing with the threat of potential German invasion by land, sea or air and destroying any hostile forces. Various statements were made about the joint use of common facilities, services and instrumentalities (surely an Americanism!). This included handing over any fifth columnists, subversive elements and espionage agents to British Forces, and stressed the importance of co-ordination and sharing information, partly by establishing joint command posts. U.S. Engineers would work on construction of docks at Reykjavic on contract to the Icelandic Government, with other projects being conducted jointly. The document detailed various arrangements for mutual co-operation and joint working.
In June 1942, Major-General Curtis submitted a review for the W.O. in his insightive paper about the occupation of Iceland since Oct. 1940. It was addressed to the Sec. of State for War -N.A. Ref. WO32/10095. The General rehearsed the reasons for the invasion of Iceland – basically because the threat to trade routes. He described the country, its climate and identified the forces used to garrison the island thus far. In particular, the use of Canadian troops – two Rifle Battalions (The Royal Regiment of Canada & Les Fusiliers Mont Royal) and a Machine-Gun Battalion (The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa) was referred to and a slight hint given of the difficulties caused by the Canadian wish to retain their troops in self-contained Canada-only formations under Canadian command. It was the Canadian Infantry that was relieved by 70th Brigade – partly as a result of a comment by P.M. Churchill (referred to in his history of WW2) when he bemoaned the “waste” of these “fine Canadian troops” in such posting and proposing that a Brigade of Second-Line Territorials would, by implication, be sufficient for what was allegedly seen as an undemanding and uncomfortable posting. Regrettable -rather different from the earlier compliments from the Sec. of State for War. ° Major-General Curtis referred to the continuing German threat and implications of any attack on Iceland for the Battle of the Atlantic. His paper referred to the Selfoss air attack, which killed one man of 1st Tyneside Scottish wounding another (though he did not mention the casualties, nor Unit). ° The Iceland Force dispositions were described, as was the naval and air situation, and included his positive experience of tri-service working, expanded to include allies from the USA in 1941 – identified as amicable and, in terms of disposing of business, satisfactory. Security problems were a constant difficulty, problems had with local press and pro-German attitudes of some members of the population. Relations with the Icelandic Govt. were handled formally through Mr Howard-Smith who gave the General much support, as did his Consular colleague, Mr Sheppard. ° The Icelanders apparently preferred a British occupation to a German one – but would rather have not had one at all, though relationships had improved with time; generally better in rural farming and fishing communities as borne out by various incidents where troops were assisted by local people. There were photographs of football matches with the children. In this context, the troops were regarded as conducting themselves in the traditional exemplary manner expected from British Forces in a foreign country. There had ben very few adverse incidents. ° Under the heading of “Administration” Major-General Curtis covered the problems of accommodation, power, health, construction work, leave, clothing and rations. Over 5000 Nissen Huts were erected, largely by the troops themselves**. The construction employed many Icelanders at fair rates of pay – an aspect of the occupation which received little publicity, but for which Icelanders were grateful, regarding the negotiation of rates and the pay systems as fair and reasonable.°
Training – part of the reason the troops were there – utilised well the space and countryside available, including considerable field firing of artillery, mortars and small arms. (It is possible that the troops of 70th Brigade were among the first British Forces to experience being fired over “live” by 25pdr guns in practicing the Company in the Attack at Kleifarvatn in 1940/1941). A Force Tactical School was established in November 1940. A Winter Warfare School was established at Akureyri in the winter of 1941/1942, in line with the Prime Minister’s decision that 49th Division should become a Mountain Warfare formation. By this time 70th Brigade had returned to the U.K. but continued the Winter Warfare training in Wales and Scotland. The General handed over command of the military forces in Iceland to his American counterpart, Major General Charles H. Bonesteel, on 21st April 1942.
ICELAND GARRISON October 1940 - June 1942
So from the South coast of England to the North Atlantic his first posting in Devon behind him he was now in Iceland and so he remained until well into 1942 - 2nd/lt.Thomas Barron Walker's Battalion, 11 DLI., took over from those Units who occupied the island from May 1940. 11 DLI. was to be a significant part of the new garrison. Their Port of Embarkation, the Princes landing stage, Liverpool, where H.M.T. Antonia weighed anchor -p.m. Oct. 20 1940, awaiting overnight on the Mersey its R.N. destroyer escorts. Other troops on board were 1st Tyneside Scottish, 187 Field Ambulance and a Detachment of Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps. The destination was secret, but the guess of many of the troops crowded below in their billets as to their destination would tuen out to be correct. The convoy was joined on the Clyde, at 08.00, October 23, by H.M.T. Empress of Australia and two armed merchant vessels, carrying the rest of 70 Brigade aboard; in total the convoy then comprised six ships, including the two main troopships. The convoy passed the Hebrides in calm seas and headed out into the North Atlantic. On Oct. 25th the mountainous coast of Iceland was sighted. The ships passing the many small fishing boats, anchored in Reykjavik Harbour. The capital of Iceland was in complete contrast to the blackout back home, twinkling, illuminated with lights like Gala Night. Disembarkation took place on Oct. 26; 'A' Company route-marching to their billet, 687 Artisan Works Company Camp, Royal Engineers, Reykjavik, and 'B' Company to the Staging Camp at Reykjavik. 'C' 'D' and HQ Companies left 'by bus' for Alafoss. At 21:00 hours HQ was established at Alafoss. At 21:00 hours that day, HQ was established at Alafoss; the diary Recd.: 'no coal, little food, no transport, but everybody happy in Nissen Huts' and, 07:00 hours sharp the next day, 'wash in hot stream at our door'. More stores were unloaded from H.M.T. Antonia in the harbour on the 27th.
UNITS & LOCATIONS were as follows:-
70TH Infantry Brigade HQ.
Alafoss two miles West of Bruarland, ten miles West of Reykjavik (first H.Q. October 1940)
Brigade H.Q. Moved to Melrose Camp, Reykjavik at the time of the interchange. This Brigade H.Q. was situated on the Reykjavik – Hafnarfðrjður Road, near Howitzer Hill .
The role of the Brigade, after exchanging with 147th Infantry Brigade was summarised as:-
(a) Defence of the Ports of Reykjavik and Hafnafjordur
(b) Defence of aerodromes at Reykjavik Airport and Keflavik Airport
(c) Guard against threats from Hunafloi, Kaldadarnes, Pingvellir. The 'Detail' involved a 'Might' -sending troops to Hvitavellir, Stadur, Sandskeid, Kotstrond as needed.
10th DLI
Battalion HQ from September 1940 – Borganes (Percy Derwent and Zetland Camps), covering the area from Akranes (Cleveland Camp, B Company HQ ) to Blonduos (Hurworth Camp). Includes Hvitavellir Bridge.
Detachment at Bordeyri (extra huts built following fires).
Coast watching post at Skagastrond.
Detachment at Reykerskoli (20 extra huts built at Morpeth Camp, February onwards 1941)
Detachment at Arnaholt – huts improved January 1941.
Company locations at Gardar and Hvaleyri – still no electricity in March 1941.
The Battalion was relieved by 12th Worcester Regt and moved to the SOUTH WEST Sector in June 1941 as part of the Brigade interchange. Took over defence of Reykjavik Aerodrome, now Reykjavik Airport .
Located in Craven, Howitzer Hill, Fossvogur and Sherwood Camps, and at Vatnsmyri Aerodrome.
11th Durham Light Infantry
Battalion H.Q. – first at Alafoss, two miles west of Bruarland.
Battalion moved, after the interchange of roles, to defend Hafnafjordur Sub-Sector, and provide garrisons for Fort Cameron, Fort Rouille, Fort York (Alfsnes Peninsula Coast Watching Post), and high ground on Lagafell,
GRAFARHOLT HILL, KELDNAHOLT HILL.
Based at Slingsby Hill, Hvaleyri Ridge, Gardar, Milnsbridge, Quarry and Amotherby Camps.
1st Tyneside Scottish (The Black Watch) Highland Regiment
First Battalion HQ – Baldurshagi BALDURSHAGI – five miles South-West of Reykjavik, with a detachment at Vatnsendi Wireless Station.
Detachment at Selfoss – one man (Pte Hunter) killed here in an air attack 9/2/1941.
Coast defence Brautarholt.
After the interchange the Battalion moved to defend the Reykjavik Sub-Sector, based at Skipton, Keighley, Bingley and Craven and at the Kkulagata Ice Factory (Gargand Camp). Tented Camps set up in the summer –
Balbo's Camp, and Thornhill Myra Camp set up in the Harbour Area.
1/5th West Yorkshire Regiment
Coast defence in Laugarnes Sub-Sector.
Small Garrison on Vestmannaeyjr.
143rd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery
Alafoss
Lambton Camp
187th Field Ambulance, RAMC
First HQ at Alafoss, adjacent to 11th DLI.
Exchanged locations with 160 Field Ambulance in Reykjavik at the time of the interchange.
Hospital Camp Helgafell.
Exercise Locations used by the Brigade in Iceland
Field firing exercises – Kleifervatn
Anti-aircraft range – Alftanes
ULFARSFELL
Hvalfjordur including landing at Saurbaer.
Kaldadarnes
Lyklafell, north of Sandskeid Landing Ground.
Red House Hill.
Footnotes: * 'Iceland (C)' was to avoid possible confusion and typing errors in referring to Ireland.
- * -some still remaining in use
Sources
Primary
Within the Military War Diaries for the period 1940 – 1941, there were various documents, such as Operational Orders on the Defence of Iceland, which made reference to the strategic considerations, which had lead the U.K. to invade the island -U.K. National Archives, Piece WO 32/9630 & WO 32/10208
& http://70brigade.newmp.org.uk/wiki/11th_Battalion,_The_Durham_Light...
Reading
Carmel in Hafnarfðrjður Chronicle of the Carmelite Convent -various
Adams, Sharon. Legion, Canada's Military History Magazine, June 15 2021 : https://legionmagazine.com/the-british-invasion-of-iceland/
The United States Marines in Iceland, 1941-1942. Lt. Col. Kenneth J. Clifford Historical Division H.Q., USMCR Ed. U.S. Marine Corps, Washington D.C. 1970
Princes Landing Stage Maritime Museum, Liverpool, MCR/90/235